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COURTROOM OF THE DISTRICT COURT
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CASSIA COUNTY COURTHOUSE
CASSIA COUNTY, BURLEY, IDAHO
AUGUST 10.2009, MONDAY. 1000 A.M.
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THE COURT: It's 10:00 A.M. on August 10th.
2009 The matter before the Court at this time is
Case CV2009-517. and the issue is a motion by the
defense for summary judgment
Are the parties ready to proceed this
morning.
MS. POINTS: Yes, your Honor.
MR. STROTHER: Yes. your Honor.
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about -and that case was one in whrch the issue
was whether an attorney had a duty to a beneficiary.

3 someone other than his c e n t who had hired him to
4 prepare the wrll.
And in deciding the case, the Court said.
6 "We hold that an attorney preparing testamentary
7 instruments owes a duty to the beneficiaries named
8 or identified therern to prepare such instruments

I9

and, if requested by the testator, to have them
properly executed so as to effectuate the testato<s
11 intent as expressed in the testamentary instruments.
If as a proxrmate result of the attorney's
professional negligence. the testator's intent as
14 expressed in the testamentary instruments is
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THE COURT: Welcome to Cassia County Counsel. I 5 frustrated in whole or in part, the attorney is
MR. STROTHER: Thank you.
16 liable to the beneficiary."
THE COURT: Would you like to use the lectern
17
The ruling of the case makes clear that
or are you comfortable using counsel table?
18 it is the language as expressed in the testamentary
MR. STROTHER If I feel naked, I'll go get
19 instrument that is decisive, and in this case the
119
the lectern
20 testamentary instrument says that the testator is
THE COURT All right.
21 grving his Interest in trusts to the plaintiff.
MR. STROTHER: Your Honor. Counsel spoke
22
Now, the affidavit of Mr. Fletcher is
23 before and agreed that it might be more logical to
23 aimed at impeaching the terms of the testamentary
24 take up the motion to strike the affidavit of
24 instrument. The evidence is not consistent with the
2:
Mr. Fletcher first.
25 testamentary instrument. it makes it appear that
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THE COURT: Oh, I wasn't aware of that issue.
2 i s there a pleading or a filing on that?
1
MR. STROTHER: Yes, sir. It was filed August
4 6th, I believe.

/

THE COURT: The last pleading in my file was
August 4th, so I'm without that.

7
MR. STROTHER: I can provide the Court with a
8 copy.
9
THE COURT: Yes, if you would, please, and
10 thank you fordoing that. Are there any additional
11 pleadings that haven't made theirway to my file?
72
MR. STROTHER: Not that I'm aware of, your
13 Honor.
14
THE COURT: All right. So the Court will
15 consider the motion, and I have reviewed the motion
16 to strike the affidavit handed to me by counsel.
17 What I'd like to do is, of course, find out why I
18 don't have that information but go ahead and receive
19 your arguments both on that particular issue first,
20 and then we'll take the summary judgment motion up
21 in the context of that particular argument.
22
MR. STROTHER: Your Honor, the argument behind
23 the motion to strike Mr. Fletcher's affidavit is
24 predicated on the case of Harrigfeld vs. Hancock.
25 and in that decision the supreme court after talking
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there was some doubt in the testator's mind as to
whether he actually had property in a trust while
the will itself, which is attached to the affidavit
of Mr. Fletcher. the will itself expresses no such
doubts.
The will says In paragraph --or clause
six "All beneficial interests that I have in any
trust I give, bequeath and devise to the plaintiff."
There's no doubt there in --expressed in the
testamentary instrument but that there is an
interest in a trust. And what Mr. FletcheCs
affidavit does is inject some doubt as to whether
there is an actual interest in a trust and.
therefore, it's impeaching the terms of the will.
Now, the rule is generally consistent. I
think, with the parole evidence rule that excludes
evidence offered to impeach the terms of a document
which is otherwise clear. in this case. the Court
has held that the will was clear. therefore, you do
not get to offer evidence into the record to impeach
the terms of the will.
It would be just like if it were a
contract. I'm going to do X. You don't get to put
in evidence that says we're going to do not X or
something thaYs almost X. 1i.s clear. You live

with the will so long as it's clear. Here the
parties have to live with or you live with the
contract in that case.
In this case the parties have to live
with the will, which is clear. You do not get to
impeach the terms of the will, and any evidence to
the contrary is irrelevant. Moreover, statements by
the testator would not be admissible, and it follows
that the statements by the testator's attorney would
not be admissible because he's, in essence, just the
agent of the testator^
For these reasons, your Honor. we would
ask the Court to strike the affidavit of
Mr. Fletcher insofar as it tends to impeach the
terms of the will at issue in this case. Thank you,
sir.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Ms. Points.
MS. POINTS: Your Honor, in the motion to
strike -- untimely filed by plaintiff in this case.
it was filed less than four days ago and it's,
therefore, not timely under the rule, and we'd move
that it be stricken on that basis alone --within
that motion there's no legal authority cited by the
plaintiff to establish that Mr. Fletcher through his

I that it's clear on the face of its terms, and that's
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affidavit cannot provide testimony of the testator
or his own testimony. Counsel's statement that
Mr. Fletcher's affidavit impeaches the terms of what
was contained in the will is absolutely incorrect.
The plaintiff here has sued Mr. Fletcher
for malpractice, and Mr. Fletcher was simply putting
into context for the Court what had transpired
between he and the deceased in coming to the
culmination of what ended up in the will. And for
the purposes of this motion, your Honor, if the
plaintiff is willing to stipulate that there is no
ambiguity in the will or the terms of the will:
Mr. Fletcher would take that.
The context given to the drafting of the
will as provided was because plaintiff took an
opposite position in the probate proceedings. If
your Honor will recall, the plaintiff took the
position that the will was absolutely ambiguous and
the Court must consider affidavits of third parties
in awarding her some award under the will. So the
context was provided preliminarily to address the
position that plaintiff had taken in the probate
action that the will is ambiguous.
In this action, your Honor, they're
taking the position that the will is not ambiguous,

exactly what position Mr. Fletcher is taking. To
the extent that the Court considers the affidavit in
the terms of the duty issue -- To back up. your
Honor, the motion for sutnmary judgment has three
cruxes. One is the argument on the judicial
estoppel claim. one is on the statute of
limitations. and the third is on whether
Mr. Fletcher had a duty to the plaintiff, which was
spoke to by counsel.
It is Mr. Fletcher's position that in the
context of the argument with regard to duty there is
no ambiguity in the face of the terms in the will,
and the Court is limited to consider the four
corners of the will in terms of duty. However, the
affidavit can speak to the issues of the estoppel
argument and the statute of limitations argument,
and we would leave that within the Court's
discretion to consider.
Unless your Honor has any other
questions. that's the defendant's response.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Reply.
MR. STROTHER: With respect to the issue of
timeliness, your Honor, it is the defense's
9

responsibility in pursuing a motion for summary
judgment to offer admissible evidence, and we could
3 have delayed raising this issue at all until today.
4 The evidence is inadmissible, and this is the day
5 set for argument on the motion, and we're were free
1

2

/
/

to argue today without notice to anybody that the
evidence was inadmissible.
By filing the motion, we just intended to
1 8
give a heads up, and we regret that you did not see
the motion ahead of time to get that heads up, but
that was the intent was to give the heads up so that
everybody would be better prepared to address the
issue today which, as I said, we didn't need to
raise until today at all.
We have no objection to Mr. Fletcher's
affidavit insofar as it speaks to the issue of
waiver and estoppel, that being conducted by the
plaintiff, Ms. Soignier. The only parts that we
object to are the parts that, as we said. tend to
impeach the will and speak to matters which the
Harrigfeld decision has said are not admissible.
Thank you, sir.
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. All right.
That all having been said then, let me take up your
25 arguments with respect to the summary judgment
6
7
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Mr. Bailiff. if you'd return to counsel the copy of
2 the objection. Thank you for providing that to me.
3 and I'll find where the orig~nalwent.
MS. POINTS: Your Honor, as I alluded to
5 before, and I'm sure your Honor has had the
6 opportunity to revrew what has been filed by
Mr. Fletcher. the motion for summary judgment is
8 couched in terms of three arguments, that being
judrciai estoppel statute of limitations and that
10 Mr Fietcher owed no duty to the plaintrff based on
11 the four corners of the testamentary instrument.
With regard to the issue of estoppel,
13 your Honor. as you might recall in the probate
14 action, the plaintiff in this case asserted a claim
15 against Mr. Cowan's estate, and the basis of that
16 argument was that there was an ambiguity in the
17 will. that Mr. Fletcher had negligently drafted that
18 will to contain those amblguities, and based on that
19 negligence and based on that drafting, the Court
20 should consider several affidavits filed by third
21 parties.
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Your Honor correctly, in Mr. Fletcher's
view, found that there was no ambiguity in that
will; that the provision in clause six that stated
if Mr. Cowan had any interest in any trust at the
11

/

1

time of hrs death, those interests would be awarded

2

to Ms. Soignier, was clear and unambiguous and
entered a motion for summary judgment and order with
that holding.
Thereafter, Ms. Soignier filed an appeal
of that order and following the filing of that
appeal settled her claims against the estate. The
claims that were brought against the estate were
based on her standing as heir to the estate And as
we outlined both in our opening memorandum and our
reply memorandum. the stipulation of her settlement
was based on language which stated all claims that
Ms. Soignier had as heir to the estate of Mr. Cowan
were settled in this settlement agreement.
Mr. Fletcher was listed as a party to that
agreement, and Mr. Fletcher signed that agreement.
And as is discussed in our reply brief, I
think most recently, your Honor, there are notations
in both the order that your Honor drafted and
filings signed by counsel by Ms. Soignier that
alleged or made reference and allegat~onstowards
the negligent drafting by Mr Fletcher
It's the posltlon of Mr Fletcher that in
settling those clalms, Ms Solgnler settled all
cla~msagainst Mr Fletcher As this malpractice rs
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couched she is claiming that she has standlng as
2 heir to Mr Cowan's estate for entitieinents that
were somehow above and beyond that which she settled
for in the probate case, and it's the position of
Mr. Fletcher that she is judicially estopped from
dorng so.
The second facet of the motion for
summary judgment is based on the statute of
limitations. As set forth in our briefing. there's
a two-year statute of limitations on an attorney
malpractice claim. Mr. Cowan's will was drafted in
May of 2006, and he died in October of 2006. 1
won't regurgitate the legal arguments here, your
Honor lt's Mr. Fletcher's position that the
statute Of limitations ran on the earlier of two
dates. which is the drafting of the will or, at the
very latest. on the date of his death as that is the
date that that will could no longer have been
amended. And based on the findings of this Court
and the apparent admission of plaintiff, there was
no ambiguities on the face of that will, therefore.
the terms of the wili controiied as of the date of
his death^
In anticipating what arguments might be
coming from piaintiffs, your Honor, there are
1

13

several cases out there that support the proposition
that in order to identify some damages, which is the
hurdle which a plaintiff must establish in order for
the statute of limitations to commence. the
plaintiff has to assert that they have --or
establish that they have suffered some damage prior
to the commencement of the statute of limitations.
There's the recent case that's cited by
both parties. the City of McCall v. Buxton. In that
case, your Honor. there are two different analyses
for when some damages might accrue. There was two
sets of claims in the City v. Buxton case. One had
to do with the attorney ill advising the City to
breach certain contracts and stop certain payments
to some contractors.
The supreme court held that until a court
decided that those -the City had, in fact,
breached the contracts and a jury found that they
were --had to pay certain damages to the
contractors, until that point they couid not
determine whether they had incurred some damage.
Therefore. the statute of limitations started to
commence on the day the jury rendered its decision.
There's another school of thought and
another set of cases in the City v. Buxton case
q't

wh~chwe belleve are al~gnedto Mr Fletcher's case
and that is there were certain liens that were in
place that were placed by the City against certain
engineering firms, and on advice of counsel, the
attorney for the City advised the City of McCall to
release those liens. That was the day they had no
more rights to come back against those engineering
firms whether it was adjudicated in a court of law
or not. it was ascertainable that they had incurred
cerlain damages on that date, the date the liens
were release&
Analogous to our case, your Honor. on the
date of Mr. Cowan's death. the unambiguous terms of
that will could not be changed to incorporate or to
add to any interests that Ms. Soignier would have
received. If he had an interest in a trust on the
date he died, she would have recovered something.
If he didn't have an interest in a trust on the date
that he died. he would recover -- she would recover
nothing, which is what happened in this case.
Therefore, some damages accrued on the date -- at
the very latest the date of Mr. Cowan's death.
The third portion of the motion for
summary judgment is based on the issue of duty. your
Honor, and that's what we've been jostling around
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here a little bit in terms of the context of
striking Mr. Fletcher's affidavit. And I think
we've briefed pretty well the Harrigfeld case that
was brought to the Court's attention by
Mr. Strother. And the Court has alluded to this
when it was drafting its probate decision, but the
holding in Harrigfeld is --the intent of the
testator is expressed only by the terms of the will,
You can't go outside the four corners of the will to
look at the testator's intent or look to extrinsic
evidence.
And if you look at the unambiguous terms
of the will, there's nothing Mr. Fletcher did that
would have affected Ms. Soignier's interests. It's
clear on the face of its terms. There's no error in
the drafting. The intent of Mr. Cowan is expressly
and unambiguously set forth in clause six of the
will.
Because there is no ambiguity or because
there is no error on the face of the will, and the
Court can take as a matter of law that those terms
are controlling as to his intent, there can be no
violation of duty on the part of Mr. Fletcher And
that's pretty clear. cut and dry, black and white
letter law holding in Harrigfeld, your Honor. And
16

it falls squarely within the facts o f z r case, and
it falls squarely within the findings of this Court
in the probate action and the admission of plaintiff
that the terms of the will are unambiguous. and the
intent is clear on the face. And nothing Mr. Fletcher
drafted in there went against the will of Mr. Cowan
as expressly set forth therein.
And if the Court doesn't have any
questions. I'llsave the rest of my time for reply.
THE COURT: I do have --I'm going to ask you
to just take a moment and think through. It's
always helpful to me in summary judgment if counsel
will take a few moments or if it's already been -you wish to do it in writing the issue of what facts
are material and what facts are and are not in
dispute is important to me. And so in support of
the motion here, if you'd take a few moments and
walk me through the facts that you believe are in
dispute or are not in dispute so that I can focus in
on those issues.
MS. POINTS: Your Honor. with regard to the
issue of duty in the context of the will, I don't
believe there is any factual dispute as to the clear
intent of Mr. Cowan as expressed in the unambiguous
terms of the will, and I believe that through the
17
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opposition t i t h e motion. plaintiff has tried to
infuse some issues of fact with the affidavit of
their expert. Mr. Magnuson, who attempts to say that
there's some standard of care issue or that the
trust that was specified in Mr. Cowan's will was, in
fact, The Leonarda Cowan Trust.
I think some issues of fact are. you
know: attempted to be infused by plaintiff, but,
your Honor, we don't believe that those are issues
of fact that are relevant to what the Court has to
consider today, and that is strictly whether
Mr. Fletcher owed a duty or breached a duty to
Ms. Soignier, because the case law is clear that the
intent is taken from the four corners of the will.
You can't look to the affidavit of
Mr. Magnuson. You can't look to what Mr. Magnuson
believes Mr. Fletcher should or shouldn't have done.
The Harrigfeld case clearly establishes that you're
limited to the four corners of the will unless
there's an ambiguity. So it's Mr. Fletcher's
position there's no issue of fact with regard to the
duty. because it's clear and unambiguous, and you
can stick to the Harrigfeld holding in that regard.
And plaintiff, I'm sure, is going to
argue through counsel that there is an issue of
f8
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fact, but Mr. Fletcher's position is that there is
not and certainly not which should preclude the
Court from r~llingon the duty issue and the motion
for summary judgment.
With regard to the statute of limitations
claims, your Honor, I similarly don't think there's
issues of fact here. We're not talking about any
issue of when the will was drafted or when Mr. Cowa
died. Plaintiff is simply taking the position that
they need a ruling from the Court to say she's out
in terms of what she could recover under the will.
and it's our position that that is not a required
finding in this case. and the Court can determine
that as a matter of law. I don't believe there's
any issue of fact there that would preclude the
Court from ruling as a matter of law on the statute
of limitations issue.
And similarly, I think that's the case
with the judicial estoppel issue. You know. I
believe plaintiff is going to argue that there has
to be some representation in open court by
Mrs. Soignier, that she really did mean it when she
said she was going to settle her claims and there
was no such statement. I don't believe that that
creates an issue of fact, your Honor. I think that
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Ms. Soignier in filing her settlement agreement with
the Court and with all parties signing off on the
agreement that the Court can take as a matter of law
that she represented, yes, I'm settling the claims,
and, yes, your Honor, you can act on that and file
an order dismissing this case. And, in fact, she
accepted $100,000 for that settlement. and none of
those issues are material fact, your Honor.
So. you know, there might be some
jostling about the facts in terms of how it was
briefed, but as it's set forth in the defendant's
opening brief and reply brief, those are red
herrings. These are really issues of law here, and
nobody really disputes the facts that are present in
the case.
There could be some issues raised, again,
by plaintiffs with regard to the duty issue, but if
you look at the clear case law that pertains to
whether there is or is not a duty, Mr. Magnuson's
affidavit is completely irrelevant to that.
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.
Opposition to the motion.
MR. STROTHER: It might shorten my remarks
your Honor, if I may inquire of counsel whether she
has waived the fourth rounds of the motion for

summary judgment argued in her opening brief, that
being waiver in quasi estoppel?
MS. POINTS: No, your Honor, we have not
waived those. We just simply chose not to raise
them in oral argument as they're pretty analogous to
the judicial estoppel argument and there's no reason
to rehash.
THE COURT: That clarifies that.
MR. STROTHER: I don't know -- Turning to
your question, your Honor, I don't know the best way
to answer it. I think there are some differing
views of the facts. The defense, for example, says
that Mr. Fletcher was a party personally to the
stipulation signed by the plaintiff in the probate
proceeding.
The plaintiff takes the position that's
not true. To make the argument of quasi estoppel,
the defense has to show some reliance by
Mr. Fletcher personally, and if they're saying there
is such reliance, we have an affidavit that says
there was no such --no consideration paid by
Mr. Fletcher at all.
To the extent that the defense is saying
that Ms. Soignier waived claims against
Mr. Fletcher, there's an affidavit by Ms. Soignier
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that says that's not true. So there may be some
issues of fact. It just depends on how you look at
it.
You have a document to construe, because.
as I understand the defense's argument, it's all -the arguments of waiver and estoppel and even of
judicial estoppel are all predicated on that
stipulation filed in the probate proceeding which is
attached to Mr. Fletcher's affidavit. The Court's
going to have to construe that. Now, whether you
view that as issues of law or if you find some
ambiguity in their issues of fact, I can't answer
that for the Court. So there may be some issues of
fact there.
With respect to the statute of
limitations, again, depending upon how the Court
views it, there may be some issues of fact here.
The question is. from our perspective, when did the
plaintiff sustain damage? The defense has its view.
We have our view. The Court may view that as an
issue of fact or it may not. I don't -- again, I
don't know how the Court is going to approach that.
With respect to duty, I don't think there
is an issue of fact. The only issue -- the issue is
whether she was named in the will. That extends --
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That means there is a duty. Much of what counsel
argued today is really negligence saying there's no
negligence. and it looks to me like there's a
blurring of the --and there has been since the time
of the opening brief, There's a blurring of the
issue of duty and the issue of negligence.
And it was -- To cover that. what we
perceived as an ambiguity in the argument.
Mr. Magnuson's affidavit was filed. But from a
legal perspective, the Harrigfeld case says there is
a duty if she's a named heir. She was a named heir.
Therefore, there was a duty. So depending on how
far you can take the defense argument. whether
you're going to get into the issues that I believe
are more negligence than duty, then there may.
again. be an issue of fact,
So, you know, that may be a more
convoluted answer to your question than you had
hoped for, but I think that from my perspective as
an attorney. your approach to the issues are going
to dictate, to some extent. whether they're issues
of fact or issues of law, and that's a matter of
your discretion that I can't foresee.
Now. let's start with judicial estoppel.
There's two - t h e two leading cases. McKay and
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Heinze v. Bauer both say there has to be a statement
in court, and it says that the plaintiff has to
receive the benefit and that there has to be an
inconsistency between what was said in the original
proceeding and what was said in this proceeding.
Now, if you look at the stipulation,
which is Exhibit B to Mr. Fletcher's affidavit, it
says in the introduction, "Come now, Steven D.
Westfall, the personal representative of the estate
of Zachary A. Cowan, by and through his special
counsel, Donald Chisholm, and the attorney of the
estate. William Kent Fletcher." So Mr. Westfall is
entering into a stipulation through his two
attorneys, Chisholm and Fletcher. And then the next
party is Mary Soignier coming through her attorneys
William Whitehead and Stanley Cole. and the American
Cancer Society coming through its attorney, William
Parsons.
So the parties to the stipulation are
Westfall, Soignier and Parsons. Mr. Fletcher is
involved only as the attorney for the estate. not
himself. And if you go through this thing, it says,
number one. all claims of Soignier under the last
will and testament as heir, devisee, or holder of
the power of appointment are settled for the sum of
24
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$100.000. It doesn't And the stipulation is
between the estate and Ms. Soignier and then another
beneficiary of the estate who has an interest in the
outcome of the case.
These are claims that are arising with
respect to her claims against the estate. It says
nothing about any claims against Mr. Fletcher, and
Mr. Fletcher is not a party to the agreement. And
if you look -- it is well established that a
stipulation is a contract, and Mr. Fletcher doesn't
qualify as a third-party beneficiary under the terms
of that contract because he's not identified as
such, He is simply signing the agreement as an
agent of the estate which is the benefit --or which
is the -- one of the parties to the agreement.
Now, harking back to the Court's
question, I suppose the Court could conclude that
the stipulation is ambiguous as to whether
Mr. Fletcher is signing in his individual capacity
or simply as the representative of the estate, and
then that would give rise, I suppose. to an issue of
fact. but from our perspective it is clear that
Mr. Fletcher is (a) not a party. and (b) not a
third-party beneficiary, and (c) that he has no
rights under the terms of the stipulation.
25
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Now. therefore, with respect to the
judicial estoppel argument, there is no
representation by the plaintiff that she's
surrendering any claims against Mr. Fletcher and,
therefore, there's no inconsistency between the
stipulation and this case. And I want to contrast
that with the McKay case in which the plaintiff was
asked in open court, "Are you at all dissatisfied
with the handling of the claiin of the minor?" And
she said no, and then she turns around and files a
lawsuit indicating her dissatisfaction with the
handling of the minor's claim.
And in the Heinze case, a divorce case,
as is typical, the judge asked the parties whether
they had any questions or problems with the deal,
and Heinze said at the time that the judge asked
him, no, he had no questions and no problems with
the deal. and then he turned around and filed a
lawsuit predicated on the fact that he had problems
and real issues with the deal that he had told the
judge he was accepting. We don't have anything
comparable to that in this case and, therefore, the
argument of judicial estoppel fails.
I'll move now to the waiver and quasi
estoppel because it's related. Waiver, as the Court
26

knows, is the knowing relinquishment of a right.
There is no statement of any rights against
M r Fletcher that are waived or relinquished in the
stipulation, and, therefore. Ms. Soignier's
affidavit that says I never waived and nobody ever
claimed that I waived, and I never dreamed that I
was waiving any claims against Mr. Fletcher is
undisputed and must be accepted as true for purposes
of this motion. And it's entirely consistent -that testimony is entirely consistent with the
stipulation.
As respect to quasi estoppel. Ms. Soignier
recited in her affidavit she received no
consideration from Mr. Fletcher, and quasi estoppel
requires reliance or a change of position by him in
this case in his individual capacity. There is no
such evidence in this case. Ms. Soignier's
affidavit is the only testimony on point and,
therefore, the argument of quasi estoppel fails.
Now the statute of limitations argument.
As I understand the defense's position, it is that
Ms. Soignier -- and maybe the best thing that I can
do is take the argument as stated in the brief where
they say that she was damaged at the time of the
drafting of the will or, at the latest, upon the
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death of Cowan in 2006. And, incidentally, I'm sure
counsel misspoke because she got it right in her
brief. The will was written in 2005. March of 2005
rather than March of 2006. Her brief is accurate,
so I'm sure that it was an inadvertent misstatement
on her part.
And if you look at page eight of the
brief, it says that she would - the plaintiff would
have been damaged at the time of the preparation of
the will in May of 2005 because there was objective
evidence that Cowan did not have any interest in the
trust at that time, which I guess means that if
everybody was exercising omniscience, they would
know a mistake had been made. And then it talks
about that it had to -- the statute had to start
running when Mr. Cowan died because the will could
no longer be changed.
The -- If you look, however, at the
statute of limitations cases, they don't run on such
factors, and if you take the plaintiffs position
that there was -- you could objectively ascertain in
2005 that a mistake had been made, therefore, the
plaintiff was damages, that proves way too much.
If you go through the statute of
limitations, your Honor, let's take Bonz vs.
28

Sudweeks, one where a release of a lis pendens was
filed in the wrong county. Of course, anybody who
iooked would know objectively it was filed in the
wrong county, and that is perhaps analogous to the
defense argument in this case. If you look at the
situation in its entirety, of course, you know
there's no trust interest. But in Bonz v. Sudweeks
it was filed in the wrong county. No question about
it. But the Court didn't start the statute of
limitations at the time it was filed in the wrong
county. Instead, the statute didn't start to run
until the plaintiff lost something because a real
estate deal that he wanted to do did not go through.
In Elliott v. Parsons you have a poor
structure of sale documents. And that was
objectively ascertainable at the time. Was it done
right or was it not? It was not done right and
everybody could tell that, and yet the statute of
limitations didn't start to run until the plaintiff
incurred attorney fees in trying to fix the mistake
that had been made.
In Fairway vs. Petersen, there was a
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Obviously ascertainable at the time, but the statute
did not start to run until a claim prosecuted in
29
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violation of that rule was dismissed.
In Stride v. Weigel there were bad tax
returns. Obviously ascertainable at the time, but
there was no damage until a tax assessment was
levied by the IRS.
All of these cases go to show, your
Honor, that the claim that Ms. Soignier was damaged
when the will was written because she didn't
because there was no trust corpus at that time is
wrong because --just because somebody -- if you're
exercising omniscience could have seen that, that's
not what starts the statute of limitations.
That's why -- You know, if you had
omniscience, any one of these cases I told you
about, the statute would have started running, but
instead you look for did the plaintiff lose money?
Did the plaintiff lose a right? Did the plaintiff
surrender property? Was there an adverse court
decision? And the common thread there is not the
theoretical situation. Is the situation worse or is
the plaintiff going to have a harder case? It is is
the plaintiff out something?
And in the Bonz v. Sudweeks they were out
the benefits of a real estate deal. In Elliott v.
Parsons they had incurred attorney fees because they

-
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= h e
mstake Too late but they saw the
2 mistake. They tried to fix it and. therefore, they
3 were out money when they started incurring attorney
4 fees. in Fairway v Petersen. there was an adverse
5 decision on the court claim. In other words, a
6 right was lost. In Stride v. Weigel the returns
7 were laying there wrong a whole long time, but it
8 wasn't until the IRS said. "Hey, you owe us money."
9 Now they're out something, and so the statute starts
0 to run^
I
So when in this case was the plaintiff
2 out something? She wasn't out anything when the
3 will was written. She wasn't out anything when
4 Mr. Cowan died. She wasn't out anything until this
5 Court ruled that she had no claim or that she was
6 entitled to nothing. That is the earliest date that
7 defense can point to that says that Ms. Cowan is out
8 anything at all. And that's why this complaint was
9 filed within two years of this Court's decision, and
0 that's why it was timely filed. because that
1 decision saying she had no claim under the will was
2 the first time that she was out anything at all.
3
Now, that brings us to the issue of duty.
4 Now, I'm not real sure how the defense wants to
5 construe that issue. but to the extent they're
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saying that Cowan was Mr. Fletcher's client and the
primary duty was owed to him, okay. that's an issue
of law. To the extent that Ms. Soignier is a named
party in the will, a duty is owed to her.
Now, if that's what we're talking about.
there is a duty, period. She's a named party in the
will and, therefore, there's a duty. Now. that is
-- in my view, your Honor, that's all the further
the duty argument goes, Is she a named party in the
will as a beneficiary? Yes or no? If the answer is
no. then there's no duty. If the answer is yes,
then there is a duty. It's that simple. That's the
duty argument.
And here's where I can't tell what the
defense is arguing. They go on to say. well, she
got what she was supposed to get. That's a
negligence argument. That's not a duty argument.
They say the argument is duty. but from our
perspective they're really arguing negligence, which
is why Mr. Magnuson's affidavit was filed, We don't
know if they're trying to call an apple an orange or
if they really mean an apple, because if they're
calling it an apple, we don't think the argument's
going in the right way. But if the issue is did
they fulfill the duty to the named beneficiary.

that's negl~gence
Is there negligence? Is there not
negligence? Mr. Magnuson's affidavit says there was
negligence. that and giving -- reading that
affidavit and giving us the reasonable inferences
from that, that if you're talking about a will --or
a trust document and you're going to say that you're
going to give certain interests arising under a
trust document to the plaintiff, then Mr. Magnuson
says you've got to do certain things, basically make
sure the documents are coordinated so that the
beneficiary. in this case Soignier, gets the will
documents. And Mr. Magnuson says you've got to
check various things.
And Mr. Fletcher's argument --and here
we get into the motion to strike. To what extent is
his testimony relevant when he says, well, I talked
to Mr. Cowan and there was some uncertainty here as
to whether there were trust assets or not. Well,
that's contrary to what the will says, because the
will says there are trust assets, period. It's not,
as counsel said. if I have trust assets. they go to
Soignier. The will says I'm giving my trust assets
to Soignier, period.
Now. the issue here is not the same as it
~

2

~

33
1
2

3
4

5
6

7

8
9
0

I
2

3

4
5
6

7

8
9
0

I
2

3
4

5

..,.

.-

was when your Honor was sitting in the probate
court. There you were enforcing a will. And what
does the will say? And we're going to do that.
Here it is. Did the attorney properly write the
will to effectuate the intent as stated in the will?
That's a different issue, and, therefore, while the
defense would have you say, well. I said the will
was clear and, therefore, this case is over, that's
not true. The issue is did the attorney in writing
this clear language do what he was supposed to do?
You can write -- use clear language that
is clearly wrong, and that's what Mr. Magnuson is
saying is that they used very clear language, but it
was just the wrong clear language. The defense
blurs over that issue by saying because the issue -because the language is clear, this case is over.
Not so. And there's no -- And for purposes of this
motion, Mr. Magnuson's affidavit is determinative on
this issue that I believe is really one of
negligence, although the defense characterizes it as
one of duty.
Unless the Court has any questions of me,
1 believe I'm done, your Honor.
THE COURT: So what you're asking me to do is
to define the nature, scope and length of the duty

1 that you're arguing arose because Ms. Soignier was

2

named as heir in this - - o r beneficiary in this
will?
MR. STROTHER: No. There either is a duty or
there's not a duty.
THE COURT: So you're not going into -- at
this polnt you're saying a duty arose and that's as
far as you need to go.
MR. STROTHER: If the argument raised by the
defense is purely duty, yes. If the duty - - if the
issue is did Mr. Fletcherfulfill his duty, then you
have to get into some of these other issues, but I
think that's a negligence issue. Whether he
fulfilled his duty is a negligence issue, not a duty
issue, The duty issue is simply a yes or no field.
THE COURT: Whether there was a breach of the
duty.
MR. STROTHER: Whether there is a breach of
the duty is a negligence issue.
THE COURT: Yes. Okay. I just wanted to make
sure I was tracking with you on that.
MR. STROTHER: But whether there is a duty is
simply yes or no. and that is a matter of law. And
I think it's answered clearly by the fact that she
is a named party or a named beneficiary in the will.
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But then you get to did he fulfill the duty', And
from where I'm sitting, that's a negligence issue.
And then you get into Mr. Magnuson's affidavit and
these other things, and that's where you say, well,
okay, he has this duty and in fulfilling it, how far
do you go and so on and so forth.
THE COURT: That helps me, I appreciate that.
MR. STROTHER: Any other questions, your
Honor?
THE COURT: I don't believe so. Thank you.
Reply.
MS. POINTS: Your Honor, I'IIbe brief. I
just a have a few comments with regard to each of
the claims. With regard to the judicial estoppel
claim, there's no requirement in the case law
speaking to the issue ofjudicial estoppel,
including the McKay case or the Heinze case, that
Mr. Fletcher be a party to the underlying case or
the underlying litigation ofwhich the plaintiff is
now taking an inconsistent position.
The inconsistent position has been taken
by Ms. Soignier, and there's no requirement in the
case law that Mr. Fletcher be an official named
party to any underlying action. Similarly, there's
no requirement that Ms. Soignier receive any
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consideration from Mr. Fletcher in that rega;d:'
Boiled down, your Honor, this claim is
brought by Ms. Soignier as an heir to Mr. Cowan's
estate against Mr. Fletcher, and it is the simple
position of Mr. Fletcher that Ms. Soignier is
estopped from bringing that claim as an heir to the
estate of Mr. Cowan because she settled it according
to the strict terms of that settlement agreement.
With regard to the statute of limitations,
again. as we stated in our briefing and I'II restate
here briefly, your Honor, there's no question that
the supreme court has required in certain cases that
some damages do not accrue to a plaintiff asserting
a malpractice claim until there is some judicial
decision on that claim. There's no question about
that.
The cases cited by Mr. Strother support
that proposition, but there's a distinction in the
case law. There's a distinction between those cases
that require some litigation to get a decision on
which a statute of limitations can begin to accrue,
and there's clearly case law that states you don't
need any litigation for that damage to accrue.
In this case on the date that Mr. Cowan
died, he had no claim -- or Ms. Soignier had no
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claim under the unambiguous terms of his will,
whether a court confirms it or not. That's the day
she lost the right. That's the day that Mr. Cowan
cannot come back and amend to say, oh, she gets X,
Y, Z in addition or she does not. The day he died
he did not have any interest in any trust, and
that's the day she was out.
With regard to the duty issue, we are not
taking the position that the only question is duty
and it's yes or no. And it's not briefed that way,
and if I insinuated that in my argument, I did not
mean to do so. How it's couched in terms of the
motion for summary judgment is very clearly outlined
in the Harrigfeld case. And the issue on
certification from the ninth circuit was does an
attorney have a duty to an intended beneficiary
under the will - - under a will? And the ldaho
Supreme Court said yes, but in very narrow
circumstances.
So it's not just a question of duty; that
is; if I'm a named beneficiary in a will does the
attorney drafting the will have a duty to me? The
ldaho Supreme Court specifically set out very
distinctly what that duty was and what an attorney
has to do to satisfy that duty. And I quote, "An
38

will and, if requested by the testator, to have them
properly executed so as to effectuate the testatois
interest as expressed in the will."
So if this interest is effectuated in the
will, that's the extent of the duty There is no
issue of material fact in this case that Mr. Cowan's
intent is expressly stated on the face of the will.
The duty IS therefore satisfied under Harrigfeld.
It does not matter that Mr. Magnuson
files an affidavit that says I think Mr. Fletcher
should have done X. Y, Z. The extent of the inquiry
for this Court under Harrigfeld is whether the
intent is effectuated on the face of the will, and
there's no issue here that it is, in fact,
effectuated. Therefore, the motion for summary
judgment should be granted for Mr. Fletcher on the
issue in accordance with Harrigfeld.
Unless your Honor has any questions,
that's all we have,
THE COURT: I don't. Thank you. Counsel, do
either of you or either side wish to have any
additional time for supplemental briefing or has
anything come up in this argument that counsel would
39

like to have some additional time on for briefing?
MS. POINTS: Not from defense, your Honor.
THE COURT: From the plaintiff?
MR. STROTHER: No, sir.
THE COURT: Therefore, then I'll consider the
matter fully submitted as of today and will take the
matter under advisement and issue a decision on the
motion just as soon as possible. Thank you all.
Travel safely going back home. Thank you.
(Recess.)
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